[United] Trenerių štabas
OGS užsidirbo dar vieną transferų langą, yes? No?
Daug lygiųjų buvo šiam sezone, kur buvo dominavimas, bet su Pereiros ir Lingardo talentais nebuvo įvarčių
Tai sumažink tų lygiųjų skaičių gerokai ir jau bus kalba apie kur kas solidesnį taškų skaičių
Matau čia galimybę stipriai patobulėt
Daug lygiųjų buvo šiam sezone, kur buvo dominavimas, bet su Pereiros ir Lingardo talentais nebuvo įvarčių
Tai sumažink tų lygiųjų skaičių gerokai ir jau bus kalba apie kur kas solidesnį taškų skaičių
Matau čia galimybę stipriai patobulėt
- velnes
- chaliavčikas galimai prie komunizmo
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Asmeniškai, tai nupirkčiau Olei Sancho su Cavani ir duočiau dirbt. Dabar atrodo, kad geriausiu atveju gaus Cavani+Dembele, kas irgi nėra labai blogai, tai su tokiais papildymais jau rezultatai rodomi turi būti. Be šitų papildymų, tikėtis daug iš sezono nėr ką.
Iš Edo POV sunku suprasti kaip viskas ten atrodo. Kitą sezona Ole matyt už vairo būtų netikėta, bet kad bus atleistas aplink kalėdas, tai abejoju
O jumis keičiasi nuomonė apie jį laiko diapazone? Man tai jis visą laiką buvo maždaug WBA lygio treneris, kurio pridėtinė vertė prie šios kokybės yra tik United DNR.
Šitus viščiukus skaičiuosim gegužės mėn.
Mano nuomonė tai nepasikeitė, bet ji yra geresnė OGS atžvilgiu nei tamstos. Tačiau jeigu prastas sezono startas pavirs į prastą sezoną, tai gali pasikeisti.
Tai turetų turėt ir field su Kloppu. Ir tuo pačiu Guardiola (2:5 namie).
United bent turi pasiteisinimą, kad 4 golus prasileido būdami mažumoj.
Velička, žinoma, atstovauja rimtai futbolo mokyklai, bet kita mokykla dėsto, jog puolimas laimi varžybas, o gynyba čempionatus
Jeigu gynėjai pjauna, tai kitos grandys neaktualios ir jų stiprint nereikia?
Juo labiau, kad pernai su ta gynyba ne stebuklai buvo, bet buvo normaliai.
Daugiau merkėm taškus nemokėdami aplošt burnlių ir newcastlų pirmu numeriu žaisdami su Pereira, Lingardu, kas su Bruno atėjimu sausį pagerėjo iškart.
Prieš tai koks Longstaffas vieną karjeros uždeda, ir verki net to vieno nesukrapštęs.
Olegunaro coaching profile: https://smarterscout.com/articles/premi ... cs-dataviz
Notice that the charts on the top and in the middle are split by home and away matches. Let's start in the top-left corner and work our way down:
Formations. Solskjaer favored a 4-2-3-1 formation but occasionally used three at the back, both home and away.
Average seconds to recover possession in open play. We measured the time between possessions in open play to see which clubs got the ball back the most quickly. Solskjaer's teams regained possession in less time than the majority of Premier League teams, especially in away matches.
Attacking style. We measure directness by looking at the total distance the ball travels during a possession versus the shortest distance to goal. A club team that passes and dribbles 100m to get 50m closer to goal is less direct than one that uses just 80m to make the same progress. We also look at the frequency of aerials in attack. Solskjaer's side was among the least likely to play in the air and was just a touch below average in terms of directness.
Defending style. We look at what happens when a team has the ball in its own half and then compare how likely they are to play out of the back versus clearing the ball or going long. We also measure the height of their press by checking how far up the pitch they tend to recover (or try to recover) balls when out of possession. Solskjaer's squad was among the most likely to play out and pressed higher at home than away.
Game flow and average substitution times. We track when teams generate expected goals in both of our models – shot creation and ball progression – and then average them minute-by-minute across all matches. Manchester United's attacking threat tended to peak around 65' under Solskjaer, and their defending was softest on either side of the break. Their attacking was more dangerous at home as a rule. Solskjaer's substitution times were similar home and away.
Average xGD. We compare expected goal difference across both halves to see how a coach uses his resources over the course of matches. Solskjaer's teams performed better in second halfs, notably in away matches, suggesting he was able to make adjustments and/or motivate them to finish strongly.
Average points. We want to see whether coaches can maintain and/or turn around results using the players at their disposal. Despite their superior expected goal difference in second halves, Manchester United still gave away more points than they gained in the closing stages of matches. The net cost was about four points over the course of the 2019-20 season, but they may have been rather unlucky in this respect.
FB touches. Manchester United's fullbacks rarely came inside to the middle of the pitch under Solskjaer, and his RBs were more adventurous in attack than his LBs.
W/WM touches. By contrast, Solskjaer's wingers and/or wide midfielders did come inside quite often in the attacking half. His right-sided wide players tracked back rather more than the left-sided ones.
Shot locations in open play. Manchester United's shots were spread fairly broadly across the penalty area and even beyond, with a lot of shots taken from wide angles, particularly on the left side. These shots usually have a low chance of scoring.
xGF effect per match. As explained in our article on black coaches in global football, we predict how well a club should perform based on the previous output of its players, then compare our predictions with actual results to see whether the head coach may be having a beneficial effect. Solskjaer's teams seemed less effective in attack than we predicted – about 0.15 xG less per game across our models – so we assigned a low probability of a beneficial effect.
xGA effect per match. By contrast, we estimated that Solskjaer's teams conceded 0.23 xG less than expected per match. This was virtually certain to signify a beneficial effect in comparison to the levels of performance that we expected from his players.